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Palm-oil operations on the island of Guadalcanal are situated in an area 
that was a hot spot during the ‘tension’ years of 1998–2003. An analysis of 
the industry therefore provides an important case study of post-conflict 
development, and of how local animosities are tempered, or exacerbated, 
by new cash-earning opportunities.  This paper examines the difference 
between the arrangements entered into by the Guadalcanal Plains 
Palm Oil Ltd (GPPOL) and its 1973–99 predecessor, Solomon Islands 
Plantations Ltd. It also looks at the impact on the industry of the 1998–99 
Isatabu uprising, and the 2004 deal struck between local landowners 
and GPPOL, at the out-grower scheme, at land tenure arrangements, 
and at the trust funds established upon recommencement of operations. 
We analyse the oil-palm operations in the broader context of the socio-
economic setting on the northern plains, with particular reference to the 
way local villagers balance their time between participation in palm oil 
production and the supply of food to the Honiara market.  
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In tandem with the revival of market 
gardening supplying the Honiara market and 
other smallholder cash-cropping activities 
such as copra and cocoa production, the 
resumption of palm-oil production has 
led to a significant improvement in living 
standards on northern Guadalcanal since 
2006. With the anticipated decline of the 
logging industry—which, in 2009, provided 
about 60 per cent of export income—palm-
oil production, goldmining (should that 
recommence) and tuna fishing are likely to 
provide the bulk of Solomon Islands’ export 
income and foreign exchange earnings in 
the years ahead. Importantly, the palm-oil 
production and the potential goldmining 
will be located within a relatively small area 
of only one of Solomon Islands’ six large 
islands, Guadalcanal. The capital, Honiara, 
the palm-oil operation and the potentially 
soon to be reopened Gold Ridge mine form 
the points of a triangle that will dominate 
formal sector economic activity in Solomon 
Islands in the near to medium term. 
tHE rEsumPtion of Palm-oil Production on Guadalcanal’s  nortHErn Plains
65
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 1 © 2010 the australian national university
Located in an area that was troubled 
by severe civil conflict during 1998–2003, 
the Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil Limited 
(GPPOL) operation differs in crucial respects 
from that of its 1976–99 predecessor, 
Solomon Islands Plantations Limited 
(SIPL), although the mill size and the area 
under cultivation remain similar. First, 
although Isatabu guerrillas evicted more 
than 20,000 Malaitan settlers from rural 
Guadalcanal during 1999–2000, none of 
the attempted peace settlements resolved 
the vexed issue of land ownership on rural 
Guadalcanal.1 The large plantation estates 
on the northern plains were de facto seized 
back by indigenous owners, but remained 
de jure SIPL-owned fixed-term estates. 
Resumption of operations depended on 
revising that arrangement.
Second, the GPPOL ownership structure 
differs from that of SIPL and the stream 
of benefits flowing to local communities 
is considerably greater. Third, GPPOL 
introduced a nucleus-estate scheme 
modelled on that pioneered by its parent 
company in western New Britain (Papua 
New Guinea), permitting Solomon Islander 
outgrowers on small blocks to supply fruit 
to the mills as an alternative to leasing land 
to the company or working on the core 
plantation estates.
The new palm-oil operation remains 
precarious, however, as indicated by arson 
attacks on the GPPOL administrative 
building at Tetere in 2006 and 2009 and 
the company’s associated threat to halt 
operations (‘Palm oil company considers 
leaving Solomon Islands’, Radio New Zealand 
International, 29 July 2009). Disputes over 
land ownership, including some resistance 
by the Ghaobata House of Chiefs and the 
declaration of the 2005 Balasuna Guadalcanal 
Leader’s Summit against the resumption of 
palm-oil production, earlier threatened to 
prevent any restart of the industry (Nanau 
2009). There also exists reluctance by local 
landowners to allow workers from Malaita 
to work on the plantations (Allen, Bourke, 
Evans, Iramu, Maemouri, Mullen, Pollard, 
Wairiu, Watoto and Zotalis 2006:42). There 
has been high employee turnover and some 
friction between management and the mill 
workforce. Out-grower participation has 
proved slow to increase and plans to expand 
eastwards—bringing under plantation an 
additional 4,100 hectares—have required 
difficult negotiations with landowners and 
the government (‘Palm oil planter Kulim 
to expand operations in PNG, Solomon 
Islands’, Palm Oil HQ: Market Intelligence & 
Prices, 26 May 2009. Available from http://
www.palmoilhq.com/). Pests and diseases, 
such as basal stem rot, caused by the 
wood-rotting fungus Ganoderma boninense, 
have the potential for detrimental effects 
on yields over the economic lifespan of 
plantations. Nevertheless, the resumption of 
the Guadalcanal palm-oil operation entails 
a revival of the country’s ‘most successful 
agricultural industry in terms of efficiency, 
international competitiveness and foreign 
exchange generation’ (McGregor 2006:25).
This article examines the GPPOL 
operation on Guadalcanal and its linkages 
with the broader economy of the northern 
plains. The first part looks at the history of 
oil-palm cultivation on Guadalcanal and 
the impact on the local economy of the 
1998–2003 ‘tensions’. The second part looks 
at the arrangements made in 2006 when 
GPPOL restarted operations. The third part 
examines historical and recent trends in 
GPPOL palm-oil production.
The northern Guadalcanal plains 
and the Isatabu uprising
The northeastern plains of Guadalcanal—the 
largest contiguous area of arable land in the 
Pacific islands—have played a critical role in 
the economic and social history of Solomon 
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Islands. During the Pacific campaign of 
World War II, Guadalcanal became a major 
focus of Allied–Japanese conflict centred on 
the Henderson Airfield (Map 1) and activity 
by the Solomon Islands Labour Corps, 
which brought migrants from other parts 
of the group to the northern plains. After 
the war, the capital of the British Solomon 
Islands Protectorate was shifted from Tulagi, 
on the neighbouring island of Ngella, to 
Honiara, on Guadalcanal, largely to take 
advantage of the infrastructure left by the 
departing American forces.
British Colonial Development and 
Welfare Aid during the 1950s and 1960s 
assisted exploration of the prospects for 
commercial ventures across the group, 
including the Tasimboko area—a search 
encouraged by efforts to establish a 
sustainable economic basis for independent 
self-government before decolonisation in 
1978. Coconut plantation estates run by 
Lever Brothers, together with the mill on 
Russell Island, were linked to operations 
in the Tenaru area, as well as further 
east at Ruavata. The northern plains also 
became a magnet for inter-island migration, 
particularly from the densely populated 
and historically underdeveloped island 
of Malaita, despite the discouragement 
of long-term settlement by the colonial 
authorities (Fraenkel 2004: 34-35).
SIPL started operations in 1973 and, 
after completion of construction of the mill, 
began exports of palm-oil in 1976.2 The 
company was co-owned by the Solomon 
Islands government (30 per cent), the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation 
(68 per cent) and local landowners (2 per 
cent). Formerly alienated land that had been 
converted to government ownership was 
leased for 75 years to SIPL, with perpetual 
Map 1 Guadalcanal plains oil-palm plantations, 2009
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estate title reverting to landowners.3 Palm 
products, including oil and kernel, made 
up an average of 11.3 per cent of Solomon 
Islands’ exports between 1976 and 1998, 
despite a major trough in 1986 when 
Cyclone Namu struck Guadalcanal’s 
northern plains. Between 1988 and 1998, 
palm-oil was Solomon Islands’ most 
valuable agricultural export commodity. 
In 1998, the year before the outbreak of 
violent conflict on Guadalcanal, the value 
of palm-oil exports was SI$94.2 million, 
compared with SI$46.8 million for coconut 
products and SI$22.8 million for cocoa 
(Figure 1). By the late 1990s, there were 
approximately 6,300 ha under oil-palm on 
estates at Ngalimbiu and Tetere and SIPL 
employed 1,800 people (Solomon Star, 2 
August 1999). The composition of the SIPL 
labour force was 65 per cent from Malaita 
and 16 per cent from Temotu Province 
(‘Nambawan palm oil bilong Iumi; message 
from SIPL to the people of the Solomon 
Islands’, Solomon Star, 26 July 1999). Most 
employees lived on housing estates at 
Ngalimbiu, Tetere, Berande, Cocoa, Balisuna 
and Okea. Including dependants, 8–10,000 
migrant settlers associated with SIPL 
activities were living on the northern plains. 
Even by the late 1970s, former migrant 
workers were shifting onto customary land 
under informal arrangements with local 
landowners, planting food gardens, raising 
pigs and cash cropping (Kama 1979:152).
Tensions between SIPL-related settlers 
and indigenes on northern Guadalcanal 
were among the key catalysts for the 
Isatabu uprising in 1999. In March 1999, the 
roadside stoning of a palm-fruit-carrying 
truck heading for the mill sparked a reaction 
from the threatened workers, who initially 
demanded compensation and—when this 
was not forthcoming—burnt down houses 
in the village of Binu (Map 1). Days later, 
Figure 1 Solomon Islands tree-crop exports, 1976–2008 (tonnes)
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there was an arson attempt at the local 
mill. In May, Isatabu Freedom Movement 
(IFM) fighters—often dressed in kabilato 
(loincloths, the traditional dress of the Moro 
Movement) (Davenport and Çoker 1967:138, 
Tara 1990)—began evicting settlers across 
the northern plains, beginning in the east 
and working westwards towards Honiara. 
The failure of the Honiara Peace Accord 
in June demonstrated that Guadalcanal’s 
senior statesmen were unable to control 
the young IFM militants. In July, SIPL shut 
down its operations and the remaining 
workers were evacuated into Honiara 
(Solomon Star, 5 July 1999). In total, there 
were about 25,000 people evicted from 
rural Guadalcanal during 1999—some 
34 per cent of the pre-crisis provincial 
population (Fraenkel 2004:55–6). The worst 
hit areas were in the vicinity of the oil-palm 
plantations: 66 per cent of the population of 
East Tasimboko was displaced, 65 per cent 
of those in West Ghoabata and 58 per cent of 
those in East Ghoabata—figures that could 
be taken as rough proxies for the share of 
settlers among the population on the plains 
(Schoorl and Friesen 2002:table 5.5, p. 133; 
Government of Solomon Islands 2000:tables 
B2.13, B2.09f).4
Efforts involving Guale leaders to reopen 
the SIPL operation in the second half of 1999 
failed and local bitterness increased as a 
result of hostility about punitive police raids 
to retrieve displaced people’s property from 
around the SIPL facility at Tetere. Oil-palm 
plantations were extensively damaged, as 
villagers sought to reappropriate lands 
for cultivation of garden produce for the 
Honiara market, and feeder roads became 
unusable (Nanau 2009:165).
In Honiara, the heavily Malaitan-
dominated Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force, in a joint operation with an emergent 
Honiara-based Malaitan militia group, the 
Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), overthrew the 
elected government in June 2000. In October, 
an attempted peace accord, brokered with 
Australian assistance, entailed the surrender 
of some weapons on both sides. In its wake, 
the conflict continued but in a changed 
configuration, involving internecine fighting 
among rival Malaitan militias in Honiara 
and, most bitterly, between the rural 
Guadalcanal guerrillas identified with the 
IFM and those associated with Harold Keke, 
who refused to sign up to the Townsville 
Peace Accord. An international peace-
monitoring team established a presence 
on the northern plains, but the security 
situation remained precarious. Only after 
the arrival of the Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 
July 2003 were the militants for the most part 
disarmed, arrested and imprisoned.
Restarting of palm-oil operations
In 2004, the PNG-based company New 
Britain Palm Oil Limited (NBPOL) obtained 
agreement from Tasimboko landowners 
to restart operations on the estates at 
Tetere, Ngalimbiu and Mbalisuna, and to 
rehabilitate the former SIPL mill. NBPOL 
is listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
with the 51 per cent controlling share 
having been obtained by the Malaysian 
state-owned company Kulim (Malaysia) 
Berhard in 1996 from its predecessor, 
Harrisons and Crossfield. The NBPOL 
palm-oil operations in West New Britain 
Province began in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
using the nucleus-estate model, entailing a 
core plantation component around which 
settlers, mostly from the Sepik region, and 
local landowners participated in supplying 
palm fruits to the mill from out-grower 
blocks (Curry 2003:413). For GPPOL, in 
contrast, land settlement schemes were out 
of the question, given the recent history of 
eviction of Malaitan settlers and continuing 
hostility to any resumption of inter-island 
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settlement; however, arrangements were 
eventually made with the loka matata 
landowner group for a 503 ha segment 
of the Tetere plantation to be operated as 
an out-grower block by Binu villagers. A 
further combined total of 314 ha, entailing 
mostly smaller blocks scattered around the 
main plantation estates, has subsequently 
been included, bringing the out-grower 
component to 817 ha (Guadalcanal Plains 
Palm Oil Limited, Unpublished data on 
out-grower land area).
GPPOL began operations in 2005 and 
the mill restarted in mid 2006. Significant 
areas of oil-palms had been planted in 
1997–99. Since oil-palms reach peak yield 
after six years, the timing of the restarting 
of operations was fortuitous. During the 
crisis years, palm fruits were left to rot on the 
trees, effectively fertilising the palms and 
keeping nutrients in balance. From 2006, 
GPPOL restarted fertiliser applications to 
maintain nutrients at an optimal level. The 
areas under cocoa that had been converted 
to oil-palm in 1994 also benefitted from 
a higher level of nutrients due to the 
residual impact of higher inputs of fertiliser 
associated with cocoa cultivation.
A crucial prerequisite before restarting 
operations was some resolution of the 
uncertainties surrounding land ownership 
on the core plantation estates. Under SIPL, 
plantation land had been leased as 75-year, 
fixed-term estates from landowners (Solomon 
Islands Plantations Ltd versus Manatedetea, 
Civil Case [5], 1997, High Court of Solomon 
Islands), with trustees obtaining rents at 
SI$100 per hectare as well as a one-off SI$500 
premium for new areas brought under 
oil-palm.5 Landowners did not want the 
Solomon Islands government to retain shares 
in the company.6 By agreement between 
the Solomon Islands government, the 
Guadalcanal provincial government, SIPL, 
local landowners and GPPOL, SIPL leases 
were cancelled and landowners instead 
leased blocks to GPPOL.7 Leases were on 50-
year terms, with a 20-year renewal option. 
Therefore, an important initial step was to 
re-establish the trustees, through a series of 
elections, for the 58 parcels of land covering 
the Ngalimbiu, Okea, Tetere, Mberande 
and Mbalisuna plantations. The elections 
proved an important means of testing local 
support for the restarting of operations and 
strengthened local backing for GPPOL.
U n d e r  t h e  n e w l y  n e g o t i a t e d 
arrangements, rent was to remain at SI$100 
per annum, together with substantial 
royalty payments calculated at 10 per cent of 
the farm-gate price. In addition, landowners 
received a 20 per cent share of company 
ownership, compared with the 2 per cent 
stake under the SIPL arrangements. In line 
with the memorandum of understanding 
between the landowners and the provincial 
and national governments, first priority with 
regard to employment is to be given to local 
landowners, then to people from elsewhere 
in Guadalcanal Province and, finally, to 
people from other provinces. Of the 2,200 
people employed by 2009, the majority were 
from Guadalcanal, although some were 
from other provinces—mainly Temotu and 
Isabel. In addition to workers at the mill 
who reside at the Tetere housing estate, 
workers are scattered across residential 
quarters attached to the main estates and 
are rostered as harvesters, upkeeping gangs, 
sprayers, wheelers, loose fruit collectors, 
road maintenance gangs and compound 
and rubbish cleaners.
Although the mill was largely destroyed 
during the tension years, the structure 
remained intact. Looting was extensive, with 
the removal of roofing iron and cladding and 
electrical components, but it proved possible 
to salvage and recondition one turbine. In 
the SIPL days, mill productivity had started 
at about 24 tonnes an hour, but by the late 
1990s it had been raised to about 28 tonnes 
an hour. With an investment of about US$8 
70
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 1 © 2010 the australian national university
million, the current mill has been brought 
up to similar speeds. A kernel mill (costing 
US$1.5 million), introduced in December 
2007, permitted GPPOL to export palm 
kernel oil—in contrast with the previous 
situation under SIPL when palm kernel 
was exported unprocessed. This has also 
allowed the export of palm kernel expeller, 
which is a high-protein cattle feed used in 
feedlots in Australia and New Zealand. 
The out-grower scheme
In West New Britain, out-grower blocks 
contribute close to 30 per cent of the area 
under oil-palm; there have been efforts 
to expand this side of the operation on 
Guadalcanal. Out-grower blocks totalling 
817 ha have been established—176 blocks 
ranging in size from less than a single 
hectare to 22.2 ha. The average block size is 
4.6 ha and on average there are 590 palms 
per block. The majority of these blocks are 
part of the Binu out-growers’ area, a large 
contiguous parcel of mature oil-palms now 
totalling 563 ha.
Initially, the community was divided 
over the issue of whether to sign its oil-palm 
land over to the company. After courting 
another potential commercial operator, 
however, the loka mamata landowners 
eventually opted to give over a small wedge 
of oil-palm land to the company (66 ha), 
while establishing the bulk of the former 
plantation as out-grower blocks. There are 
114 out-grower blocks in the loka mamata out-
grower area, averaging 4.9 ha in size. Five 
per cent of the proceeds from palm-oil sales 
to the company go into a fund managed by 
the Tetere Outgrowers’ Association, which 
is a registered company. Out-growers 
can access credit from the association; 
in order to repay debts, GPPOL deducts 
money from payments at the source. The 
association also extends financial assistance 
for unanticipated traditional exchange 
requirements, particularly funerals.
The remaining 314 ha of out-grower 
blocks are scattered around different parts of 
the greater GPPOL area, although there are 
a few larger areas of contiguous blocks—for 
example, at Kautoga, which was run as 
a cooperative during the SIPL days and 
has been revived as a cooperative with EU 
asistance. The land tenure arrangements 
for many of these blocks differ significantly 
from those in the Binu area, as they are 
usually on customary land that, in some 
cases, has never been alienated or registered. 
The company has adapted a procedure 
developed in West New Britain to facilitate 
participation in oil-palm cultivation. 
Prospective out-growers are required to 
complete a ‘smallholder approval form’, 
which asks for confirmation of customary 
right to use and occupy land for the growing 
of oil-palm. This form requires the signature 
of the ‘clan chief’ and the ‘paramount 
chief’, and in cases of dispute entails parties 
agreeing to resolve these through the Tribal 
Lands Dispute Resolution Panel.8 Where 
agreement is reached on the participation 
of new blocks, GPPOL provides interest-
free loans to cover start-up costs, as well as 
seedlings and technical assistance.
The company is in the process of 
introducing a new system that will record 
and monitor the tonnages of palm-oil 
coming from each out-grower block. Data 
and anecdotal evidence, however, indicate 
quite significant variation in productivity 
across the 170 out-grower blocks and from 
individual blocks over time. This is thought 
to be related to a number of factors that can 
be broadly characterised as social relations 
and labour organisation. For example, it 
appears that out-growers sometimes weigh 
their fruit on another block-holder’s net 
because they owe them money or as part of 
a production drive organised along kinship 
lines.9 It is further thought that some blocks 
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are ‘share-cropped’ as extended-family 
ventures while others are run more as 
individually owned enterprises, and that 
this also impacts on the productivity of 
blocks. The precise nature and extent of these 
practices warrant further investigation.
Out-growers harvest oil-palm fruit 
according to a roster that allows each block-
holder to sell fruit twice a month and be 
paid on the fifteenth day of each month 
for the previous month’s sales. Harvesting 
follows a three-day program. The fruit 
is harvested on the first day, taken to the 
roadside for collection on the second and 
picked up by a company truck on the third. 
Out-growers commonly engage extended 
family members and paid labourers to 
assist with harvesting, and operable wage 
rates have been an issue of local contention. 
Off-duty company workers are often 
employed for this purpose, but a new 
labour market is more broadly in operation. 
Decisions about labour allocation are 
made with consideration given to various 
price signals—palm-oil, cocoa and fresh 
produce at the Honiara market—as well to 
the demands of subsistence and customary 
activities. The Asian Development Bank-
rehabilitated road eastwards from Honiara 
made the Honiara market more accessible 
and enhanced the scope for smallholders to 
earn cash income through market gardening 
and cocoa and copra production.
Landowners and the plantations
While out-growers receive the full farm-gate 
price, those landowners who lease land for 
inclusion in the plantation side of the GPPOL 
operation obtain 10 per cent of the farm-gate 
price in royalties. Each of the 58 parcels 
of registered land leased to the company 
for its plantation estates is represented by 
five trustees. These trustees manage the 50 
per cent of royalty payments that are paid 
directly to the 58 trust boards in proportion 
to the area of land that is under oil-palm on 
each parcel. Royalties are paid according 
to area rather than real production output 
because otherwise those landowners whose 
oil-palms had become senile and required 
replanting in 2005 would have had to have 
waited several years before receiving any 
royalty payments. The other 50 per cent of 
royalties is paid into a fund administered by 
an investment committee comprising two 
representatives—a man and a woman—
from each of the five main tribes: Ghauvata, 
Thimbo, Dhogo, Lathi and Nekama. This 
committee is effectively a subcommittee of 
the Guadalcanal Landowners’ Association, 
which has 17 members on its executive and 
is the peak body representing landowners 
in the greater GPPOL area.10
In 2008, the company paid a total of 
SI$6.9 million in royalties and SI$769,000 
in rent. The landowners’ 20 per cent 
equity in the company is handled by a 
registered company called the Guadalcanal 
Plains Resource Development Association 
Company Limited. The company has five 
directors—again, representing the five 
main tribes. Landowners tend to lease 
larger blocks to the company but retain 
smaller blocks that are manageable by local 
communities as out-grower blocks.
Fluctuations in output
In mid 2006, the mill was restarted, supplied 
by the Tetere and Ngalimbiu plantations. 
Palms further eastwards, covering the 
Mbalisuna and Mberande plantations, 
were mostly senile and these areas were 
largely replanted. In total, 4,000 ha were 
rehabilitated and 2,000 ha replanted. Output 
has increased from all three plantation areas 
(Figure 2 shows Mbalisuna and Mberande 
under Mbalisuna and Okea together with 
Ngalimbiu). The pronounced fluctuations 
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shown in the data for Ngalimbiu, where 
the oil-palms are most mature, reflect an 
annual cycle of production. The low season 
runs from June or July to October; the crop 
then increases, hitting its peak in April/May. 
The slight dip in out-grower production 
in 2008–09 could be a response to lower 
international prices, but it is more likely the 
result of lower fertility as palm fruit is now 
harvested regularly. The residual nutrient 
benefit has probably diminished and the 
high cost of fertiliser can discourage out-
growers from carrying out application.
Fluctuations in export earnings have 
followed price trends determined by big 
international producers, such as Malaysia 
and Indonesia, which together account for 
about 87 per cent of world palm-oil output. 
Palm-oil tends to track the soya bean oil 
price, with strong palm-oil prices in years 
of poor global soya harvests and vice versa. 
Falling commodity prices in late 2008, 
combined with high levels of global stocks, 
encouraged producers in Indonesia and 
Malaysia to replant large areas. Governments 
in both countries encouraged domestic use 
of palm-oil to generate biofuels in order to 
diminish stocks. Palm-oil prices steadily 
increased from late 2006 through to July 
2008, followed by a large dip, as with 
many globally traded commodities, and a 
subsequent slow recovery from mid 2009.
Conclusion
With 6,000 ha currently under production, 
the expansion of GPPOL-run plantations 
is likely to require the bringing under 
cultivation of plantations further eastwards 
of the Mberande River, including former 
plantations at Ruavata and Rere. Eastwards 
Figure 2 Guadalcanal Palm Oil Plantations Limited output, June 2006 – October 2009 
(no. of fresh fruit bunches)
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expansion will not involve the felling of 
virgin forest, as has occurred on Vanguna 
Island, in the Western Province, where 
the Solomon Islands government in 1999 
allowed 10,000 ha of land to be ‘cleared’ 
(that is, logged) for an oil-palm plantation 
that never eventuated (See Kinch, Mesia et 
al, ‘Socioeconomic baseline study: Eastern 
Marovo Lagoon, Solomon Islands, IWP-
Pacific Technical Report (International 
Waters Project) no. 35,  http://www.sprep.
org/att/publication/000536_IWP_PTR35.
pdf.). Land being registered in the Auluta 
Basin area has been earmarked for oil-palm 
plantation (‘Government urged to fast track 
palm oil project’, Solomon Times, 14 August 
2008; Cook and Kofana 2008), but the 
appropriateness of that area for the industry 
has been questioned. So far, the managed-
estate areas at GPPOL have been only on 
registered land. Expansion eastwards will 
necessarily involve the mobilisation of 
customary land and out-grower areas, as 
the proportion of the total area under oil-
palm is likely to increase. To the east, also, 
the alternative of supplying market produce 
to the Honiara market is less attractive 
owing to the greater distances involved and, 
correspondingly, leasing land or engaging 
as out-growers supplying the mill become 
more attractive options. Development of a 
further 1,500 ha would require an increase 
in mill capacity, probably entailing the 
construction of a second mill. 
This examination of the GPPOL 
nucleus-estate operation has identified a 
number of key areas for further research. 
We are particularly interested in the way 
local participation in the out-grower and 
plantation oil-palm operations is influenced 
by the alternative of obtaining cash incomes 
through marketing garden produce from 
an area that has historically been the 
‘bread basket’ for the capital, Honiara, and 
through other smallholder cash-cropping 
activities, particularly cocoa production.11 
Although productivity might be higher on 
the plantations, as is frequently the case, 
out-growers balance their participation in 
palm-oil with subsistence and cash-cropping 
and with the requirements of the indigenous 
gift-exchange economy.12 The location of 
the operation in an area still troubled by a 
legacy of conflict also offers a case study of 
development in a post-conflict setting. The 
expansion of the operation has required an 
interesting range of arrangements for the 
mobilisation of customary land and the 
management of trusts and current revenues 
arising from rents and royalties accruing to 
landowning groups.
Notes
1 See, for example, Honiara Peace Accord, 28 
June 1999 (available from http://www.paclii.
org/pits/en/treaty_database/1999/6.html); 
Townsville Peace Agreement, 15 October 2000 
(available from http://www.commerce.gov.
sb/Gov/Peace_Agreement.htm). The history 
of land transactions on Guadalcanal is currently 
the subject of a commission of inquiry. 
2 Trial plantings began in 1971.
3 The Mberande plantation was compulsorily 
acquired by the government from landowners 
and leased to SIPL (Peter Larmour, Personal 
communication, 17 December 2009).
4 A very small, but nonetheless significant, 
number of settlers, normally intermarried, 
remained on rural Guadalcanal throughout 
the tensions era.
5 For these arrangements, see Kabutaulaka 
(2000). SIPL rents were SI$65 a hectare but 
rose to SI$100 in the 1990s.
6 SIPL had been 30 per cent owned by the 
government, 2 per cent by local landowners 
and 68 per cent by the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation.
7 Some GPPOL land remains as fixed-term 
estates—for example, parts of Tetere, 
including the administrative buildings and 
the local school.
8 These panels do not currently exist. The draft 
legislation to establish them, the Tribal Lands 
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Dispute Resolution Bill, was released for 
public consultation in 2008. This consultation 
is continuing, with no set date for completion. 
Under the draft legislation, a series of Tribal 
Land Dispute Resolution Panels would be 
established, not a single panel as implied 
on the ‘smallholder approval form’ (Daniel 
Evans, Personal communication, 21 January 
2010).
9 Curry (2003) documented similar practices in 
the case of out-grower schemes in West New 
Britain.
10 The breakdown of the membership of the 
Guadalcanal Landowners’ Association 
execut ive  across  the  f ive  t r ibes  i s 
commensurate with the size of the tribes and 
the amount of land that each has leased to the 
company. Ghaobata tribe has seven members 
on the executive, Thimbo has three, Dhogo 
has three, Lathi has two and Nekama has 
two. Each tribe elects their representatives. 
There are currently only two women on the 
executive. 
11 For earlier studies, see Lasaqa (1969) and 
Bathgate (1978).
12 This finding resembles that in Curry (2003); 
however, the proximity of the capital, Honiara, 
and in particular, the Honiara market, also 
generates a significant alternative outlet for 
garden produce.
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